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Chapter 5
Scale
Derangements of Scale
Timothy Clark
When we observe the environment, we necessarily 
do so only on a limited range of scales; therefore our 
perception of events provides us with only a low-
dimensional slice through a high-dimensional cake
– Simon A. Levin
Introduction: Scale Effects
You are lost in a small town, late for a vital appointment somewhere in 
its streets. You stop a friendly-looking stranger and ask the way. Gen-
erously, he offers to give you a small map which he happens to have in 
his briefcase. The whole town is there, he says. You thank him and walk 
on, opening the map to pinpoint a route. It turns out to be a map of the 
whole earth.
The wrong scale.
A scale (from the Latin scala for ladder, step or stairs) usually enables a 
calibrated and useful extrapolation between dimensions of space or time. 
Thus a “cartographic scale” describes the ratio of distance on a map to 
real distances on the earth’s surface. To move from a large to small scale 
or vice versa implies a calculable shift of resolution on the same area or 
features, a smooth zooming out or in. With climate change, however, we 
have a map, its scale includes the whole earth but when it comes to re-
lating the threat to daily questions of politics, ethics or specific interpre-
tations of history, culture, literature, etc., the map is often almost mock-
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ingly useless. Policies and concepts relating to climate change invariably 
seem undermined or even derided by considerations of scale: a campaign 
for environmental reform in one country may be already effectively ne-
gated by the lack of such measures on the other side of the world. A long 
fought-for nature reserve, designed to protect a rare ecosystem, becomes, 
zooming out, a different place. Even the climatology works on a less than 
helpful scale: “Paradoxically, it is simpler to predict what will happen to 
the planet, a closed system, than to make forecasts for specific regions” 
(Litfin 137).
Cartographic scale is itself an inadequate concept here. Non-carto-
graphic concepts of scale are not a smooth zooming in and out but in-
volve jumps and discontinuities with sometimes incalculable “scale ef-
fects.” For instance:
In the engineering sciences, scale effects are those that re-
sult from size differences between a model and the real sys-
tem. Even though a miniature model of a building made of 
wood is structurally sound, it is not necessarily appropriate 
to infer that the same process maintaining structural stabil-
ity could hold for a full-size building made of wood. ( Jener-
ette and Wu 104)
To give another instance, a map of the whole earth, at a “small” scale 
in cartographic terms, is at an enormous scale ecologically, one at which 
other non-linear scale effects become decisive and sometimes incalcula-
ble. Garrett Hardin writes:
Many stupid actions taken by society could be avoided if 
more people were acutely aware of scale effects. Whenever 
the scale is shifted upward, one should always be alert for pos-
sible contradictions of the conventional wisdom that served 
so well when the unit was smaller…. Failure of the electorate 
to appreciate scale effects can put the survival of a democratic 
nation in jeopardy. (52)
Some thinkers less controversial than Hardin draw on complexity the-
ory to suggest the necessary emergence of scale effects with merely the 
increasing complexity of globalizing civilization: “once a society devel-
ops beyond a certain level of complexity it becomes increasingly fragile. 
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Eventually it reaches a point at which even a relatively minor disturbance 
can bring everything crashing down” (MacKenzie 33). For others, the 
environmental crisis is in part caused by the effects of conflicting scales in 
the government of human affairs. Jim Dator writes:
Environmental, economic, technological and health factors 
are global, but our governance systems are still based on the 
nation state, while our economic system (‘free market’ capi-
talism) and many national political systems (interest group 
‘democracy’) remain profoundly individualistic in input, al-
beit tragically collective in output (215–6).
Scale effects in relation to climate change are confusing because they 
take the easy, daily equations of moral and political accounting and drop 
into them both a zero and an infinity: the greater the number of people 
engaged in modern forms of consumption then the less the relative in-
fluence or responsibility of each but the worse the cumulative impact of 
their insignificance. As a result of scale effects what is self-evident or ra-
tional at one scale may well be destructive or unjust at another. Hence, 
progressive social and economic policies designed to disseminate West-
ern levels of prosperity may even resemble, on another scale, an insane 
plan to destroy the biosphere. Yet, for any individual household, motor-
ist, etc., a scale effect in their actions is invisible. It is not present in any 
phenomenon in itself (no eidetic reduction will flush it out), but only 
in the contingency of how many other such phenomena there are, have 
been and will be, at even vast distances in space or time. Human agency 
becomes, as it were, displaced from within by its own act, a kind of de-
monic iterability.
The argument of this paper is that dominant modes of literary and 
cultural criticism are blind to scale effects in ways that now need to 
be addressed.
Derangements of Scale
One symptom of a now widespread crisis of scale is a derangement of lin-
guistic and intellectual proportion in the way people often talk about the 
environment, a breakdown of “decorum” in the strict sense. Thus a sen-
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tence about the possible collapse of civilization can end, no less solemn-
ly, with the injunction never to fill the kettle more than necessary when 
making tea. A poster in many workplaces depicts the whole earth as giant 
thermostat dial, with the absurd but intelligible caption “You control cli-
mate change.” A motorist buying a slightly less destructive make of car is 
now “saving the planet.”
These deranged jumps in scale and fantasies of agency may recall rhet-
oric associated with the atomic bomb in the 1950s and after. Maurice 
Blanchot argued then that talk of humanity having power over the whole 
earth, or being able to “destroy itself,” was deeply misleading. “Human-
ity” is not some grand mega-subject or unitary agent in the sense this 
trope implies. In practice such destruction would certainly not be some 
sort of consciously performed act of self-harm, “humanity destroying it-
self.” It would be as arbitrary as was “the turtle that fell from the sky” and 
crushed the head of Aeschylus (Blanchot 106).
The almost nonsensical rhetoric of environmental slogans makes 
Blanchot’s point even more forcefully. Received concepts of agency, ra-
tionality and responsibility are being strained or even begin to fall apart 
in a bewildering generalizing of the political that can make even filling a 
kettle as public an act as voting. The very notion of a “carbon footprint” 
alters the distinctions of public and private built into the foundations of 
the modern liberal state. Normally, demands in a political context to face 
the future take the form of some rousing call to regained authenticity, 
whether personal, cultural or national, and they reinforce given norms of 
morality or responsibility, with an enhanced sense of determination and 
purpose. With climate change this is not the case. Here a barely calcu-
lable nonhuman agency brings about a general but unfocused sense of 
delegitimation and uncertainty, a confusion of previously clear arenas of 
action or concepts of equity; boundaries between the scientific and the 
political become newly uncertain, the distinction between the state and 
civil society less clear, and once normal procedures and modes of under-
standing begin to resemble dubious modes of political, ethical and intel-
lectual containment. Even a great deal of environmental criticism, mod-
eling itself on kinds of progressive oppositional politics and trying (like 
Murray Bookchin’s “social ecology”) to explain environmental degrada-
tion by reference solely to human-to-human hierarchies and oppressions 
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can look like an evasion of the need to accord to the nonhuman a discon-
certing agency of its own.
The environmental crisis also questions given boundaries between in-
tellectual disciplines. The daily news confirms repeatedly the impossibil-
ity of reducing many environmental issues to any one coherent problem, 
dysfunction, or injustice. Overpopulation and atmospheric pollution, 
for instance, form social, moral, political, medical, technical, ethical and 
“animal rights” issues, all at once. If that tired term “the environment” has 
often seemed too vague—for it means, ultimately, “everything”—yet the 
difficulty of conceptualizing a politics of climate change may be precisely 
that of having to think “everything at once”. The overall force is of an im-
plosion of scales, implicating seemingly trivial or small actions with enor-
mous stakes while intellectual boundaries and lines of demarcation fold 
in upon each other. The inundation of received intellectual boundaries 
and the horror of many probable future scenarios has the deranging ef-
fect, for instance, of making deeply unsure which of the following two 
statements is finally the more responsible—(1) “climate change is now 
acknowledged as a legitimate and serious concern and the government 
will continue to support measures to improve the fuel efficiency of mo-
tor vehicles” or (2) “the only defensible relationship to have with a car is 
with a well aimed brick”?1
Contra “Liberal Criticism”
How then can a literary or cultural critic engage with the sudden sense 
that most given thought about literature and culture has been taking 
place on the wrong scale?
The most controversial political effect of climate change may be its 
challenge to basic dominant assumptions about the nature and seeming 
self-evident value of “democracy” as the most enlightened way to con-
duct human affairs. David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith write: 
“colossal environmental problems, both existing and impending, have 
been accelerated by the freedoms and corruption of democracy and are 
unlikely to be solved by this system of governance” (15). The decisive 
target here is “liberal democracy” and the now dominant liberal tradition 
in political thought, i.e. the tradition that combines institutions of private 
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property, market-based economics, individualistic-rights-based notions 
of personhood and the conception of the state as “existing to secure the 
freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis” (Brown, Edgework 
39). The liberal political tradition looking back to Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke sees politics as essentially a matter of compacts between 
individuals for the unmolested use of individual property and exploita-
tion of natural resources. Such concepts of right seem at first merely neu-
tral: the rights that apply to a hundred people, or to a hundred million, 
could surely also apply to billions? Some questions about scale, however, 
emerge when it is remembered that the founding conceptions of the lib-
eral tradition emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “in 
low-population-density and low-technology societies, with seemingly 
unlimited access to land and other resources,” in a world, that is, that 
has now been consumed ( Jamieson 148). On top of this, “[Locke] takes 
for granted that there will be enough, that the goodness of things pro-
vides enough so that taking by one or a group does not deprive others” 
(Ross 57). Structurally committed to a process of continuous economic 
growth, modern Western society effectively projected as its material con-
dition an ever-expandable frontier of new land or resources. This impos-
sible demand or assumption, long disguised by the free gift of fossil fuels, 
has now become visible and problematic. What Hans Jonas writes of “all 
traditional ethics” applies here: it “reckoned only with noncumulative be-
haviour” (7).
Liberal notions of extending the status of the rights-bearing individual 
to more and more people are caught up in a complex and bewildering 
economy of violence. Climate change disrupts the scale at which one 
must think, skews categories of internal and external and resists inher-
ited closed economies of accounting or explanation in a way even Jacques 
Derrida seems not to have suspected. Referring to Derrida’s well-known 
account in Specters of Marx (1993) of the “10 plagues” (81–3) held to be 
threatening the world, Tom Cohen notes the puzzling absence of any ref-
erence to environmental crisis, arguably the most deadly of all:
[Derrida‘s] manoeuvre looks weak today, all ten being fairly 
standard and all human-to-human political miseries—from 
worklessness to weak international law. Today, as we “know,” 
the entire gameboard has been invisibly haunted by its own 
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drive to auto-erase, or auto-eviscerate its non-anthropic 
premises. (qtd. in Wood 287)
True, Derrida writes of incalculable responsibility and the conceptual 
and physical destabilization of borders, of national frontiers and the “at 
home.” His On Hospitality (2000) argues how the supposedly inviolable 
interiority of the home is already de-constituted, turned inside-out, by 
its multiple embeddings in public space, the state, the telephone line, 
monitored emails, etc., yet there is residual idealism in Derrida’s exclu-
sive attention to systems of law and communication (61). The focus on 
the moment of decision in individual consciousness and its pathos (its 
ordeal of undecidablity, etc.) seems narrow and inadequate in a context 
in which things have now become overwhelmingly more political than 
people. Nothing in his work seems to allow for a situation in which it is 
not irrational to connect a patio heater in London immediately with the 
slow inundation of Tuvalu in the Pacific. Thus On Hospitality mentions 
TV, email and internet but not the central heating system, cooking ap-
pliances, washing machine or car (or, for that matter, the institution of 
private property itself, despite its crucial connection to Derrida’s topic of 
personal sovereignty). In effect, “All reality is politics, but not all politics 
is human” (Harman 89).
Wendy Brown argues that Derrida’s “treatment of freedom reveals the 
hold of liberalism on his formulations of democracy,” (“Sovereign Hesita-
tions” 127) that his arguments still work within an essentially liberal con-
ception of politics as devising systems to enable the space of individuals’ 
seeming freedom to live as they choose, the challenge being to extend 
such politics beyond current borders and even beyond an exclusively hu-
man reference.2 Reconfiguring a notion of the subject as openness to the 
other etc. instead of an autonomous self-presence, and attention to apo-
rias of freedom/equality and conditional and unconditional hospitality, 
do not alter the basic terms of Derrida‘s commitment to a liberal progres-
sivist tradition whose assumptions of scale are here at issue. In support 
of Brown’s point one can argue that a seeming blindness to nonhuman 
agency and to scale effects tends to preserve the political in On Hospital-
ity as a factitiously separate sphere. Yet environmental issues enact a be-
wildering generalization of the political that makes Derrida’s focus on hu-
man norms, institutions, and decisions look like a kind of containment. 
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His conception of the moment of decision as a negotiation with the un-
decidable is simultaneously both trivialized and magnified by scale ef-
fects in relation to such minutiae as turning a light on or deciding to buy 
a freezer. The later Derrida’s frontier questions of conditional or uncondi-
tional hospitality can seem foreclosed in scale, two-dimensional, for they 
ignore that ubiquitous border already contiguous with all other countries 
at the same time, a shared atmosphere. To live the hourly trivia of an af-
fluent lifestyle in France is already to lurk as a destructive interloper in 
the living space of a farmer on the massive floodplains of Bangladesh.
A nonhuman politics also raises questions about the dominant, lib-
eral/progressive cultural politics of much mainstream professional liter-
ary criticism. The frequent method now is to read all issues as forms of 
cultural politics within an understanding of the text analogous to way the 
liberal tradition sees civic society generally, viz. as an arena for the con-
testation of individual or collective interests, rights or identity claims. For 
example, Group A is seen to achieve its self-celebratory image through its 
(implicit) denigration of Group B, while Group C is seen as itself “mar-
ginalized” by the way Group B always seems to identify it with Group 
A, instead of being a distinct set with its own claims…and so on.3 Yet 
each, at the same time, is staking its own rights to air, water, space and 
material resources and to focus solely on the rights of the individual per-
son or group elides the issue of the violence continually and problem-
atically being waged against the earth itself, whose own agency is both 
taken for granted and disregarded. It is as if critics were still writing on 
a flat and passive earth of indefinite extension, not a round, active one 
whose furthest distance comes from behind to tap you uncomfortably on 
the shoulder. Modes of thinking and practice that may once have seemed 
justified, internally coherent, self-evident or progressive now need to be 
reassessed in terms of hidden exclusions, disguised costs, or as offering a 
merely imaginary or temporary closure. How this will work out in prac-
tice, however, is harder to predict—at least beyond the trivially obvious 
(“Well, I always thought Kerouac‘s On the Road was an irresponsible 
book, but now this!”).
Perhaps then the most trenchant environmental and postcolonial criti-
cism in relation to climate change would be one which took up the more 
meta-critical role of examining assumptions of scale in the individualist 
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rhetoric of liberalism that still pervades a large body of given cultural and 
literary criticism. An ethic attending such work would also breach cur-
rent notions of decorum, redrawing the seeming boundaries of privacy 
whereby, say, a critic’s professed views on history, religion, colonialism 
or ethics are all seen to belong in the realm of “public” controversy, semi-
nars, papers and conferences while the resources sequestered to that per-
son’s sole use remain a supposedly “private” matter, with a high salary and 
its attendant life-style still regarded, if at all, as a matter of prestige.
Reading Raymond Carver’s “Elephant” on a scale of six centuries
In what ways are inherited and currently dominant modes of reading in 
literary and cultural criticism blind to questions of scale? The issue can be 
tested through a practical reading experiment. How would it be to read 
and reread the same text through a series of increasingly broad spatial 
and temporal scales, one after the other, paying particular attention to 
the strain this puts on given critical assumptions and currently dominant 
modes of reading?
Let us turn here to a specific literary example, Raymond Carver’s late 
short story, “Elephant” (1988). This text is a comic monologue consist-
ing of the complaints and then gradual acceptance of a male blue-collar 
worker who is continually being pestered for money by hard-pressed 
relatives in other parts of the country. Most of “Elephant” happens be-
tween domestic interiors linked by telephone. The narrator’s recently 
unemployed brother, a thousand miles away in California, requiring im-
mediate help to pay the mortgage on his house, seems later to be able to 
forgo more borrowing because his wife might sell some land in her family 
but finally comes asking for money once more. He has already had to sell 
their second car and pawn the TV. The narrator’s daughter has two chil-
dren and is married to:
A swine who won‘t even look for work, a guy who couldn’t 
hold a job if they handed him one. The time or two he did 
find something, he overslept, or his car broke down on the 
way to work, or he‘d just be let go, no explanation and that 
was that. (77)
Scale 157
The narrator’s aged mother, “poor and greedy,” (74) relies on the sup-
port of both her sons to maintain her independent lifestyle amid signs 
of failing health. The narrator’s son demands money to enable him to 
emigrate and a divorced wife has to be paid alimony. Struggling with his 
resentment as he writes all the cheques, the narrator reaches a turning 
point with two dreams, one of them being about how his father used to 
carry him on his shoulder when he was a child, and he would feel safe, 
stretch out his arms and fantasize that he was riding an elephant. The next 
morning, giving a kind of private blessing to all his relatives despite their 
demands, he decides to walk rather than drive to work, leaving his house 
unlocked. Walking along the road, he is stretching out his arms as in his 
dream of childhood when a workmate called George stops to pick him 
up. George has a cigar and has just borrowed money to improve his car. 
Together they test it for speed:
“Go,” I said. “What are you waiting for, George.” And that’s 
when we really flew. Wind howled outside the windows. He 
had it floored, and we were going flat out. We streaked down 
that road in his big unpaid-for car. (90)
With the new questions posed by climate change in mind, what kinds 
of readings emerge of such a text?
Firstly, perhaps, that if “Capitalism must be regarded as an economy 
of unpaid costs,” (K. William Kapp, qtd. in Foster 37) then “Elephant” 
could easily read as a kind of environmental allegory, as a narrative of a 
chain of unpaid debt and unearned support extending itself into the fi-
nal image of the large unpaid for car. This relatively obvious first reading, 
however, can be deepened by considerations of scale.
Any broadly mimetic interpretation of a text, mapping it onto different 
if hopefully illuminating terms, always assumes a physical and temporal 
scale of some sort. It is a precondition of any such mapping, though al-
most never explicit in the interpretation. The scale in which one reads a 
text drastically alters the kinds of significance attached to elements of it, 
but, as we will see, it cannot itself give criteria for judgment.
Three scales can be used. Firstly, we could read the text on a (critically 
naïve) personal scale that takes into account only the narrator’s immedi-
ate circle of family and acquaintances over a time scale of several years. 
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At this scale there is a certain humanist coziness about the text, as if the 
Carver story were already a commercial screenplay. Family loyalty wins 
out against misfortune; love and forgiveness prevail in a tale of minor but 
genuine domestic heroism. The reading could refer to Carver’s defense 
of the short story as throwing “some light on what it is that makes and 
keeps us, often against great odds, recognizably human” (Nesset 104). 
In this respect “Elephant” would even come close to being a kind of 
Carver schmaltz.
A second scale is that almost always assumed in literary criticism. Spa-
tially, it is that of a national culture and its inhabitants, with a time frame 
of perhaps a few decades, a “historical period“ of some kind. Almost all 
criticism of Carver is situated at this scale, placing his work in the cultural 
context of the late twentieth century United States (or sometimes, on a 
broader scale, that of the modern short story after Edgar Allan Poe). Kirk 
Nesset, writing in 1995, is representative: “Carver’s figures dramatize and 
indirectly comment upon the problems besetting American culture, par-
ticularly lower middle-class culture, today” (7). Other topics prominent 
in discussions of Carver are broadly located at this scale, such as unem-
ployment and consumer culture as they affect personal relationships, 
the ideals and realities of American domesticity, that society’s material-
ism, and its concepts of gender, especially masculinity. This scale enables 
an interpretation of the final scene of “Elephant” as an affirmative but 
temporary moment of escape from the denigrations and frustrations of 
American consumer capitalism, focused on the private car as an image of 
individual freedom and mobility.
The third, hypothetical scale is, of course, the difficult one. It could be, 
spatially, that of the whole earth and its inhabitants, and placing “Ele-
phant” in the middle of a, let us say, six hundred year time frame i.e. from 
three hundred years before 1988 to 2288, three hundred after, and bear-
ing in mind authoritative plausible scenarios for the habitability of the 
planet at that time.
What does this do? An initial impulse is that trying to read “Elephant” 
at this scale simply does not “make sense.” It seems deliberately to repeat 
the kind of derangement of scale familiar in environmental slogans (“eat 
less meat and save the planet”). At the same time, the feeling of paraly-
sis or arbitrariness in the experiment cannot override the conviction that 
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to read at scales that used, familiarly, to “make sense” may now also be a 
form of intellectual and ethical containment.
What, then, is being held off? Viewed on very long time scales, hu-
man history and culture can take on unfamiliar shapes, as work in envi-
ronmental history repeatedly demonstrates, altering conceptions of what 
makes something “important” and what does not.4 Nonhuman entities 
take on a decisive agency. Thus some would argue that, globally, the two 
major events of the past three centuries have been the industrial exploi-
tation of fossil fuels and a worldwide supplanting of local biota in favor 
of an imported portmanteau of profitable species: cattle, wheat, sheep, 
maize, sugar, coffee, eucalyptus, palm oil, etc. Thus it is that most of the 
world’s wheat, a crop originally from the middle east, now comes from 
other areas—Canada, the United States, Argentina, Australia—just as 
people of originally European descent now dominate a large propor-
tion of the earth’s surface. This huge shift in human populations, includ-
ing slaves as well as domesticated animals and plants, has largely deter-
mined the modern world, with its close connections between destructive 
monocultures in food production, exploitative systems of international 
trade and exchange and the institution of the modern state. At its bleak-
est, an ecological overview of the current state of the planet shows a huge 
bubble of population and consumption in one species intensifying expo-
nentially and expanding at a rate that cannot be supported by the planet’s 
resources for long. It is the transitory world of this bizarre, destructive 
and temporary energy imbalance that Western populations currently in-
habit and take for a stable and familiar reality.
One element of containment in lower scale readings of “Elephant,” 
blind to this bigger reality, is the “methodological nationalism” of read-
ings located at the middle scale. “Methodological nationalism” is a term 
taken from A.D. Smith and used by Ulrich Beck: “While reality is be-
coming [or always was?] thoroughly cosmopolitan, our habits of thought 
and consciousness, like the well-worn paths of academic teaching and 
research, disguise the growing unreality of the world of nation-states” 
(21). That is, we often still think, interpret and judge as if the territori-
al bounds of the nation state acted as a self-evident principle of overall 
coherence and intelligibility within which a history and culture can be 
understood—ignoring anything that does not fit such a narrative. After 
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all, literary criticism itself evolved primarily as an institution of cultural 
self-definition at this scale. Almost all literary criticism of Carver could 
be instanced here. Even so seemingly innocent a phrase as Carver’s “the 
dark side of Reagan‘s America” (qtd. in Nesset 4) may instantiate meth-
odological nationalism in proportion to the degree in which the national 
sphere and its cultural agenda serve exclusively to enframe, contain, and 
shape an analysis or the familiar—but contained—judgments of social 
“inclusion” and “exclusion.”
The expanded scale makes familiar critical assumptions about the ad-
equacy of a national context look parochial, self-interested and damaging. 
What happens if one deploys at the third global scale the methodology of 
mainstream cultural criticism, with its broadly liberal, progressive agenda 
and questions of equity, those topoi of “inclusion” and “exclusion”? The 
rhetoric of marginalization and impoverishment common in readings 
of Carver becomes at the very least complicated by the fact, on a glob-
al scale, that while their distress is undeniable none of the characters in 
“Elephant” is actually poor in a material sense. The narrator has a house 
to himself and also a car. The supposedly impoverished brother had two 
cars and was forced to sell one of them to help keep his house. The sup-
posedly poverty stricken daughter, with her husband and children, lives 
in a trailer but has at least one car. The brother’s wife is a landowner and 
the son requires money to do something most living people will never 
do, travel in an airplane to another country. The mother does not live 
with any of her children but is maintained in a household of her own. 
It is not the number of people but the number of separate households 
demanding support that is the real economic issue in “Elephant,” keep-
ing the property each represents. The culture of independence affirmed 
in the narrator’s indignant work-ethic also effectively serves economic 
and infrastructure systems that set up a continuous dependency on high 
levels of consumption and, as a result, produces a pervasive and intensi-
fying sense of entrapment. “If nothing succeeds like success, nothing also 
entraps like success” ( Jonas 9).
Derrida argued how the supposedly self-contained “inner” realm of the 
at home, the house, the personal household, is constitutively breached by 
its embeddedness in public space, yet his very set up repeated liberal con-
ceptions of politics, even if it complicated them. At the third scale, how-
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ever, everything and everyone is always “outside”: a person registers there 
less in terms of familiar social coordinates (race, class, gender and so on) 
than as a physical entity, representing so much consumption of resources 
and expenditure of waste (not the personality, but the “footprint“). Like 
a great deal of twentieth century literature (including, say, On the Road), 
the effect of embedding “Elephant” within the third scale is to turn the 
text into a peculiar kind of gothic, a doppelganger narrative. Characters as 
“persons” and responsible agents are now doubled by themselves as mere 
physical entities. The larger the scale the more thing-like becomes the sig-
nificance of the person registered on it (even as scale effects have given 
human beings the status of a geological force). Plots, characters, setting 
and trivia that seemed normal and harmless on the personal or national 
scale reappear as destructive doubles of themselves on the third scale, 
part of a disturbing and encroaching parallel universe, whose malign real-
ity it is becoming impossible to deny. It becomes impossible to sustain 
the fiction that significant historical agency is the preserve of human be-
ings alone. The material infrastructure that surrounds and largely dictates 
the lives of the people, the houses, the cars, the roads, may partially dis-
place more familiar issues of identity and cultural representation as a fo-
cus of significance. Technology and infrastructures emerge not only as in-
herently political but as unpredictably doubly politicized in scale effects 
that deride the intentions of their users or builders. “Elephant” could be 
described in terms of what William Ophuls calls “energy slavery,”5 the op-
pressive, all-pervading, and destructive effects of being born into a fos-
sil fuel based infrastructure as aggressive as an occupying army. A futural 
reading of “Elephant” would thus be more object-centered, aware of the 
capricious nature of nonhuman agency and suspicious of the way con-
temporary criticism, even ecocriticism, tends to interiorize all environ-
mental issues as ultimately questions of subjective attitudes or belief, of 
humanity acting reflexively upon itself (even “humanity destroying it-
self ”). For instance, there is nothing really “private” about a car, just as, 
ironically, the average person’s decisions to fill or not fill a kettle will al-
most certainly be of more real consequence, however minuscule, than 
their political opinions ever will.6 Along with the households demanding 
to be sustained, the politics of energy slavery reappear even in such seem-
ing daily trivia as how the daughter’s partner allegedly loses the chance of 
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a job because his car broke down, or the way the narrator’s brother prom-
ises,” I’ve got this job lined up. It’s definite. I’ll have to drive fifty miles 
round trip every day, but that’s no problem—hell, no. I’d drive a hundred 
and fifty if I had too” (83). Cars also proliferate themselves through the 
parasitism of ideologies of individual “freedom”—“Elephant” ends with 
the narrator in the passenger seat, on a high of speed urging on George, 
complete with cigar, to drive as fast as he possibly can.
To highlight nonhuman agency adds a missing dimension to such fa-
miliar critical topoi, in reading Carver, as the erosion of communal val-
ues, or to the social/cultural force of Carver’s so-called minimalism in 
short story technique, its projection of a late-capitalist society of disjunc-
tive surfaces and personal isolation in which the lack of a completely reli-
able sense of relation between cause and effect, intention and result, ef-
fort and reward, is accompanied by a pervading sense of insecurity. The 
futural reading further decenters human agency, underlining the fragility 
and contingency of effective boundaries between public and private, ob-
jects and persons, the “innocent” and “guilty,” human history and natural 
history, the traumatic and the banal, and (with technology) the conve-
nient and the disenfranchising. In sum, at the third scale, a kind of non-
anthropic irony deranges the short story as any easily assimilable object 
of any given kind of moral/political reading.
Simon Levin writes “That there is no single correct scale or level at 
which to describe a system does not mean that all scales serve equally 
well or that there are not scaling laws” (1953). However, there are cru-
cial differences between reading a literary text at multiple scales and the 
function of scales in scientific modeling and explanation. In such model-
ing, suppression of detail is seen as strength of work at large scales, where 
broad patterns can emerge overriding individual variations. A literary 
reading clearly works in no such way. Assumptions of scale are always at 
work in any reading, but these may enable different judgments of value, 
not decide them. The three scales produce readings of “Elephant” that 
conflict with each other, yet can the third scale act as some final frame of 
reference or court of last appeal deciding for us how to read the text? An 
ecological overview is in danger of feeding a reductive but increasingly 
familiar green moralism, keen to turn ecological facts into moral impera-
tives on how to live, blind to the sense of helplessness dominant in “El-
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ephant” at the first scale. While it highlights the hidden costs of lower 
scale thinking, the third scale’s tendency to register a person primarily as 
a physical thing is evidently problematic, almost too brutally removed 
from the daily interpersonal ethics, hopes and struggles that it ironizes. 
For instance, although this essay chose the less controversial example of 
cars, the most environmentally significant aspect of the situation project-
ed by the text would be the reproduction of people themselves. The fact 
that the narrator has fathered two children would be more crucial—in 
the brutal terms of physical emissions—than either his lifestyle or prop-
erty. This highlights an issue, overpopulation, which reduces even Donna 
Haraway to contradiction—or, more strictly, to thinking on conflicting 
scales at the same time—when she says in an interview “as a biologist,” 
“in the face of a planet that’s got well over 6 billion people now”:
the carrying capacity of the planet probably isn’t that. And I 
don’t care how many times you talk about the regressive na-
ture of anti-natalist ideologies and population control ideolo-
gies. All true, but without serious population reduction we 
aren’t going to make it as a species, and neither are thousands 
or millions of other species….So you can hate the Chinese 
for the one-child policy and also think they are right (laughs). 
(qtd. in Schneider 153)
In sum, reading at several scales at once cannot be just the abolition of 
one scale in the greater claim of another but a way of enriching, singular-
izing and yet also creatively deranging the text through embedding it in 
multiple and even contradictory frames at the same time (so that even 
the most enlightened seeming progressive social argument may have 
one in agreement on one scale and reaching for a conceptual brick on 
another). The overall interpretation of “Elephant” offered here can only 
be a multiple, self-conflictual one. The acts of the narrator remain ones of 
great personal generosity even if, at the same time, scale effects ironically 
implicate them in incalculable evil. The text emerges, simultaneously, de-
pending on the scale at issue, as (1) a wry anecdote of personal heroism, 
(2) a protest against social exclusion, and (3) a confrontation with the 
entrapment of human actions and decisions within a disastrous imper-
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sonal dynamic they do not comprehend, as well as the various contain-
ments of inherited modes of thinking.
A further conclusion seems clear. Thinking of climate change in rela-
tion to literary or cultural criticism will not be a matter of inventing some 
new method of reading per se, for its most prominent effect is of a de-
rangement of scales that is also an implosion of intellectual competences. 
It is far easier for critics to stay inside the professionally familiar circle of 
cultural representations, ideas, ideals and prejudices, than to engage with 
long-term relations of physical cause and effect, or the environmental 
costs of an infrastructure, questions that involve nonhuman agency and 
which engage modes of expertise that may lie outside the humanities as 
currently constituted. This would also suggest that the humanities as cur-
rently constituted make up forms of ideological containment that now 
need to change.
Notes
1. This does not exclude that deceptive fix, the electric car. Most of the polluting 
emissions associated with any car come from the process of its manufacture. 
The electricity that powers a supposedly eco-friendly car would need to have 
been generated somewhere.
2. Brown contrasts the alternative notion of democracy as the difficult 
challenge of genuinely sharing power to the liberal conception of delegated 
power as supposedly forming the outward-facing barrier behind which 
individual “freedom” is lived out. Vincent B. Leitch, querying the absence 
of any communitarian element in Derrida’s political thinking, finds “a 
long rightward-leaning libertarian shadow [cast] over Derrida‘s left-wing 
democratic politics” (242).
3. I go into more detail on this in the chapter “Freedoms and the Institutional 
Americanism of Literary Study,” in my The Poetics of Singularity: The Counter-
Culturalist Turn in Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and the Later Gadamer 11–31.
4. See, for instance, Ponting, Crosby, Chew, and Diamond.
5. See Ophuls 169–74.
6. Michael Northcott writes: “The ascription ‘private’ is increasingly problematic 
when applied to automobiles. Their use requires the public maintenance of an 
extensive concrete, steel and tarmac infrastructure, representing one half of 
the built space of European and American cities” (215–6).
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